Who we are, what access we need, how that access is bounded, and how our design lines up with the ACSC Essential Eight and the Information Security Manual. Where a control is yours, not ours, we say so.
01 / CORPORATE VERIFICATION
Appware Pty Ltd is a registered Australian company
This is a self-assessment of design alignment, not an assessment by an independent assessor and not a maturity-level claim.
Strategy
Status
How it relates to an Appware audit
Application control
Customer-owned
The audit inventories compute (EC2, ECS) so the allow-listing scope is known. It does not enforce control.
Patch applications
Out of scope
The baseline audit does not scan workloads for application patch levels.
Configure Microsoft Office macro settings
Not applicable
Not an AWS infrastructure control.
User application hardening
Not applicable
Not an AWS infrastructure control.
Restrict administrative privileges
Reported in dossier
The IAM exposure ledger lists wildcard actions and PassRole escalation paths. Appware's own access is one read-only role.
Patch operating systems
Out of scope
The baseline audit does not scan operating system patch levels.
Multi-factor authentication
Reported in dossier
Long-lived access keys and users without MFA are listed in the IAM ledger.
Regular backups
Partly reported
The Reliability pillar checks snapshot and backup coverage. Remediation scripts snapshot before deleting anything.
03 / ISM ALIGNMENT
Information Security Manual areas, with evidence you can inspect
ISM area
Appware design control
Where you can check it
Cryptography
Tenant vaults encrypted under a dedicated KMS key; TLS for all public pages.
KMS key policy per tenant
System hardening
Single read-only role, seven actions, no secrets or data-plane access.
Role policy in your IAM console
Access control
Named principal, 192-bit ExternalId, one-hour sessions, no standing keys in your account.
AssumeRole events in your CloudTrail
System monitoring
Every Appware access is recorded in your account's CloudTrail, outside Appware's control.
CloudTrail event history
Data and cloud sovereignty
Customer data stays in ap-southeast-2; the legal entity is Australian.
Region shown on every stored artifact
Data transfers
Dossiers are delivered to the nominated contact and their delivery state is shown in the order portal.
Onboarding email and order portal
04 / ISOLATION INVARIANTS
Guarantees that follow from arithmetic and kernel behaviour
Each item is a property you can verify yourself, not a promise about our intentions.
Read-only by construction
The role policy lists 7 read or list actions (ce, cloudwatch, ec2, ecs, bedrock). There is no write, delete, IAM, S3 or secrets action, so Appware cannot change your account even if it wanted to.
Check: IAM console, role policy
192-bit ExternalId
The ExternalId is appw_ plus 32 URL-safe base64 characters: 32 x 6 bits = 192 bits of entropy, issued server-side and enforced by the stack's AllowedPattern.
Check: CloudFormation parameter pattern
Bounded sessions
MaxSessionDuration is 3600 seconds, so a leaked session credential is useless after one hour.
Check: Role setting
Every access is logged by you
Each assume-role call appears in your own CloudTrail as AssumeRole with the Appware principal and your ExternalId condition.
Check: Your CloudTrail
Mode 0700 vaults
A sovereign vault directory has permission bits rwx------. The kernel refuses every uid except the owner, which raises PermissionError instead of returning data.
Check: stat on the vault path
Instant revocation
Delete the stack or the role and the trust is gone immediately. No Appware action is needed.
Check: CloudFormation delete-stack
05 / FOR CTOS AND CISOS
Security questions we are asked first
What access does Appware need?
One CloudFormation-created IAM role that trusts a single named Appware principal, guarded by an ExternalId and limited to seven read or list actions.
Can Appware change or delete anything in our account?
No. The role has no write or delete actions. Remediation scripts in the dossier are for your team to review and run with your own credentials.
Where is our data stored?
In ap-southeast-2 (Sydney). Sovereign Retainer vaults use a dedicated KMS key in the same region.
How do we revoke access?
Delete the CloudFormation stack or the role. The trust ends immediately and every earlier session expires within one hour.
Do you hold ISO 27001, SOC 2 or IRAP certification?
This site makes no third-party certification claim. The Essential Eight and ISM tables are a self-assessment of design alignment, not an assessment by an assessor. Ask us for the details behind any row.
Can we review your controls before we engage?
Yes. Email the address in the footer and we will walk your security team through the role, the vault design and the evidence listed on this page.